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I. The Problem of Private Power
I turned to Jerome Barron's classic article on First Amendment
rights of access to the press1 just as a story appeared in the newspa-
pers. Many political organizations now use a technology called short
message service, more colloquially called text messaging, to reach
large numbers of people. If you give an organization your cell phone
number and sign up for their text messaging program using a "short
code," they will send you regular text messages about subjects they
think are important.2 The messages travel through your cell phone
carrier's system. NARAL Pro Choice America, an abortion rights
group, contacted Verizon requesting permission to send its text
messages to Verizon subscribers using a five digit short code, and Ver-
izon refused, saying it violated its policy against "controversial or un-
savory text messages."' 3 Verizon said it would block messages coming
from NARAL Pro Choice America. 4 As soon as this refusal became
public, Verizon backed down, arguing that its employees had misap-
plied its policy and that of course NARAL was welcome to send
messages through its system.5 But Verizon reiterated its right to block
any messages it thought were inappropriate.
6
Why could Verizon refuse NARAL? Telephone companies that
provide traditional voice service are regulated as "telecommunications
services" and are treated as common carriers under Title II of the
Communications Act.7 Common carriers must provide communica-
* Jack M. Balkin, Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale
Law School. My thanks to Susan Crawford and Robert Post for their comments on previous
drafts of this essay.
1 Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L.
REV. 1641 (1967).
2 For an explanation of the use of short codes for text messaging subscription, see About
CSCs-Common Short Codes, http://www.usshortcodes.com/csccsc.html (last visited Apr. 16,
2008).
3 Adam Liptak, Verizon Rejects Text Messages from an Abortion Rights Group, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, at Al (citation omitted).
4 See id.
5 See Adam Liptak, Verizon Reverses Itself on Abortion Messages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com2007/09/28fbusiness/28verizon.html.
6 Id.
7 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 (2000).
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tions services to the general public and cannot discriminate based on
content or speaker. 8  The Federal Communications Commission
("FCC"), however, has not yet held that it will treat cell phone com-
panies' text messaging services as common carriers, even though they
use much of the same equipment. 9
In fact, most information services in the digital age, including the
broadband services through which most people connect to the In-
ternet, are free from the common carrier obligations of traditional
phone service.10 One of the biggest fights in telecommunications pol-
icy today is whether such services should have any obligations of "net-
work neutrality."" A legislative requirement of network neutrality
would mean, among other things, that information carriers and con-
duits like Internet service providers ("ISPs") could not block, slow
down, or give preferential treatment to packets moving through their
system on the basis of the content of the packets. 12 Broadband carri-
ers, which include telephone companies like Verizon, have argued that
there is no need for network neutrality; telecommunications compa-
nies will not unreasonably discriminate against traffic because doing
so is bad for business.13 Free markets, they argue, will guarantee free-
dom of speech.
14
Jerome Barron's article, written in 1967, shortly before the Su-
preme Court's decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,'5 ar-
gued that freedom of speech in the United States was at greatest risk
not from state suppression of speech but from private suppression
from mass media.' 6 Today, people often identify the article with the
8 See 47 U.S.C. § 202 (2000) (describing nondiscrimination requirements for common
carriers).
9 See Liptak, supra note 3; Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comment on Pe-
tition for Declaratory Ruling that Text Messages and Short Codes Are Title II Services or Are
Title I Services Subject to Section 202 Non-Discrimination Rules, 23 F.C.C.R. 262 (2008); Public
Knowledge, Petition for Declaratory Ruling Stating that Text Messaging and Short Codes Are
Title II Services or are Title I Services Subject to Section 202 Nondiscrimination Rules (filed
Dec. 11, 2007), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/text-message-petition-20071211.
pdf.
10 See Liptak, supra note 3.
11 See id.
12 See.Brad Stone, Comcast Altering Its Method of Managing Web Traffic, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 2008, at C2.
13 But cf Liptak, supra note 3 ("In rejecting the NARAL program, Verizon appeared to
be acting against its economic interests.").
14 Cf. id. ("Some scholars said such a [common carrier] rule was not needed for text
messages because market competition was sufficient to ensure robust political debate.").
15 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
16 See Barron, supra note 1, at 1641-42, 1646-47.
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argument that the First Amendment creates positive rights.'7 But
Barron's real focus was on the power of private censorship. The First
Amendment, Barron argued, protected people who already had ac-
cess to a medium of communication, but it offered no assistance to
"those whose ideas are too unacceptable to secure access to the me-
dia."'1 8 Giving media companies free speech rights to control access
meant that the First Amendment became "a rationale for repressing
competing ideas."' 9 Barron denied that a free market would promote
free speech because mass media would refuse to carry information
that did not serve their bottom line, and they would shy away from
"unorthodox, unpopular, and new ideas, '20 preferring bland and min-
dless entertainment with commercial appeal.
"Today," Barron wrote, "ideas reach the millions largely to the
extent they are permitted entry into the great metropolitan dailies,
news magazines, and broadcasting networks. ' 21 "Only the new media
of communication," he argued, "can lay sentiments before the public,
and it is they rather than government who can most effectively
abridge expression by nullifying the opportunity for an idea to win
acceptance. ' 22 The constitutional protection against abridging free-
dom of speech is "not applied to the very interests which have real
power to effect such abridgment. ' 23 "Indeed," Barron argued,
"nongoverning minorities in control of the means of communication
should perhaps be inhibited from restraining free speech (by the de-
nial of access to their media) even more than governing majorities are
restrained by the [F]irst [A]mendment, ' 24 because the minorities who
owned media companies had no electoral mandate from the public.2 1
The First Amendment's guarantees were "useless," Barron argued, "if
a restraint on access is effectively secured by private groups. '26
The Verizon/NARAL story and the larger discussion about net-
work neutrality are part of the modern-day debate about private
power in telecommunications. We are still fighting about the role of
17 See, e.g., Gregory P. Magarian, Market Triumphalism, Electoral Pathologies, and the
Abiding Wisdom of First Amendment Access Rights, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2007).
18 Barron, supra note 1, at 1641.
19 Id. at 1642.
20 Id. at 1647.
21 Id. at 1655-56.




26 Id. Barron also foresaw that media would use the First Amendment to deny access and
to avoid regulation. Id. at 1661-63.
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private power in structuring opportunities for free expression. And
yet the world is quite different today. The private power that con-
cerned Barron in 1967 is not the same.
II. Speech Conduits and User-Generated Content
Today, the most powerful and important methods of communica-
tion flow through telecommunications conduits-wire, cable, and
wireless services-owned by private companies. They include cable
companies, phone companies (wired and wireless), ISPs, and Internet
backbone providers. For the most part, these conduits allow people to
send content from one place to another or mount applications on top
of their delivery services, like search engines, e-commerce applica-
tions, or voice over Internet protocol ("VOIP") phone communica-
tions. These conduits make money by allowing people to
communicate with each other. Although the government could treat
these companies as common carriers, or impose obligations of nondis-
crimination like network neutrality, it has chosen not to do SO.
27
In addition to ISPs, broadband companies, and Internet back-
bone providers, there are a whole range of online service providers,
like YouTube, Blogger, and their parent company Google; social
networking sites, like MySpace and Facebook; Flickr, a photo-sharing
service owned by Yahoo; and virtual worlds, like Second Life. These
online service providers offer platforms through which people can find
content, create new content, transform existing content, and broadcast
the content to others. For example, Flickr allows people to publish
photos, while MySpace allows people to create Web pages, serve
videos and content, link to friends, and send messages. These online
service providers, in turn, host other online service providers-like in-
dividual bloggers and Web site operators-who create their own con-
tent online and also create spaces for others to communicate. My own
blog, Balkinization,28 uses a blogging platform hosted by Blogger. It
allows the members of my blog to reach a large audience, including
journalists and other members of the traditional mass media. Because
I have turned comments on, it also allows readers to talk back to the
bloggers and criticize what we have to say.
Like ISPs and broadband companies, online service providers
like MySpace and Blogger are conduits for other people's speech and
27 See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
974-75 (2005) (noting that the Federal Communications Act currently "regulates telecommuni-
cations carriers, but not information-service providers, as common carriers").
28 Balkinization, http:/Ibalkin.blogspot.com (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
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communications. Indeed, a key element of their business models is
providing widespread access to media and encouraging mass partici-
pation. That is because their business models depend on user-gener-
ated content: that is, they depend on people using their facilities to
place new content online and manipulate or comment on existing con-
tent. For example, some businesses make money from selling adver-
tising space; fresh user-generated content draws people to spaces
where advertising is displayed and keeps them coming back. A virtual
world may make money from a subscription model and so it wants
users to spend time in the world to make new things, build communi-
ties, and add variety and competition to the world.
As a result, online service providers do everything they can to get
people to sign up, use their services, and add new information. You-
Tube depends on fresh user-generated content and cannot survive
without it. Virtual worlds are interesting to their users, and keep them
coming back, because people in these worlds continuously interact
with each other and create new things. Social software sites like
Facebook and MySpace demand widespread social participation and
fresh content to attract new users and satisfy existing ones. The power
of Google's search engines depends on people creating Web pages
and links that Google can scrape and index.
Finally, we have the traditional media conduits of newspapers,
television, radio, and cable television, which combine content delivery
with content production, and which tightly control the messages that
they publish or broadcast. These conduits, which dominated the
world of 1967, remain very important today. Yet they are now outliers
in the current media ecology precisely because they do not allow the
public to communicate with each other through them. Instead, they
mostly communicate to other people, and they strictly control any out-
sider content they allow to appear on their media. These are the me-
dia that concerned Jerome Barron in his famous 1967 article. They
are still central to our culture: they set agendas for public discussion,
and much of the blogosphere, for example, comments on and reacts to
what they say. Nevertheless, their importance has diminished. They
are no longer alone, and we cannot understand today's media ecology
by viewing traditional mass media as even the paradigm case.
Indeed, these "traditional" conduits are increasingly merging
with and becoming more like the newer conduits, particularly online
service providers like Blogger, Facebook, and YouTube. The "dead
tree" newspaper, The New York Times, shares most of its content with
the Web site NYT.com, but there the similarity ends. On NYT.com,
2008]
HeinOnline -- 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 937 2007-2008
The George Washington Law Review
individuals can write comments to the site's many different blogs and
even to some of its editorials and op-eds. 29 Indeed, the very fact that
NYT.com now hosts a variety of blogs, with all of the user content
they generate, is an important sign of the times (pardon the pun).
NYT.com is by now far more than an online newspaper. It is an on-
line service provider that facilitates and encourages user-generated
content. It hopes to draw people to the site, and keep existing users
coming back, with the promise that they can write things that will ap-
pear on the site and that others can read. That user base, in turn,
helps NYT.com sell online advertising. Indeed, NYT.com is only be-
ginning to scratch the surface of what other online service providers
already do and will do in the future.
Amazon.com offers the chance for every customer to be a book
reviewer. Facebook and MySpace become valuable to other users
(and thus to advertisers) because people willingly add content to their
sites and use them to communicate to others. Google and YouTube
thrive off Web pages and videos created by the public. The older
model of one-to-many mass communication has been supplemented, if
not replaced, by a model of mass communication that invites and even
depends on user-generated commentary and content. These days,
conduit owners are literally begging people to use their sites to talk to
others, to add valuable content to their sites, and to draw other users
to visit them. It is the Tom Sawyer theory of telecommunications-
inviting users to whitewash the fence (or contribute to the platform)-
that the conduit provides.
In short, just as in 1967, the world of communication is a world of
information conduits, most of which are in private hands. And just as
in 1967, the practical freedom of speech is deeply tied to how these
conduits work and what kinds of access and opportunities they offer
to ordinary citizens. The difference today is the technological struc-
ture of these conduits, the business models that these technologies
make possible, and the opportunities for public participation that flow
from these technologies and business models.
How can we preserve and expand the opportunities and the ac-
cess that today's information conduits provide? In 1967, Jerome Bar-
ron thought that the First Amendment, suitably interpreted by courts,
could help secure media access and promote public participation in
29 See The New York Times: Opinion, http://www.nytimes.com/pages/opinion/index.htm
(last visited Apr. 16, 2008). Several of the Times' columnists also have separate blogs through
which readers can respond to previous op-eds. For example, Paul Krugman's blog is at http://
krugman.blogs.nytimes.com.
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mass media. My view, by contrast, is that although First Amendment
values are quite important in shaping public policy and technological
design, the First Amendment itself, at least as interpreted by courts,
will do very little to promote these goals. Indeed, the question
whether the First Amendment secures affirmative guarantees of ac-
cess to media only arises after we have already stipulated a particular
kind of media ecology: a set of technologies subject to regulation and
a set of business models that grow up in this ecology. Usually, by the
time judicial enforcement of the First Amendment gets involved, the
basic parameters of media-and media access-have already been set.
Then it is already too late.
Barron's 1967 article exemplifies this point. It is divided into two
halves. The first, and larger, half is a full-scale attack on private
power and on the condition of the public sphere, which he finds too
bland, too cowardly, and too dominated by a small number of
sources.30 Then, in the second half of the article, Barron offers his
solution: a judicial remedy that would give representatives of signifi-
cant groups in the community a limited opportunity to have their
voices heard in newspapers, radio, and television stations.31 Barron's
proposal was probably thought of as radical in its own day. But from
today's perspective what is remarkable is how modest his proposal
was and how limited in scope. Technological changes and changes in
the methods of information creation and delivery have allowed far
greater participation and far greater ability to reach mass audiences
and shape public opinion than his proposed judicial remedy ever
could.
III. Knowledge and Information Policy
This brings me to my central point: The basic problem of media
access is not constitutional in the legal sense, i.e., what the U.S. Con-
stitution demands or forbids. Rather, it is "constitutional" in a techno-
logical and social sense: what kinds of technologies, business models,
social formations, and user practices constitute the media ecology.
Law plays a crucial role in shaping and regulating technologies, busi-
ness models, social formations, and user practices, but traditional
judge-made First Amendment law-at least the kind Barron wrote
about in 1967-plays a surprisingly minor role.
30 See Barron, supra note 1, at 1644-47.
31 See id. at 1667-68, 1677-78.
20081
HeinOnline -- 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 939 2007-2008
The George Washington Law Review
Media access depends on the kind of media we have, how they
are designed, what types of communication and what affordances they
make possible, and what administrative rules and statutory regulations
we design to govern them. Media access also depends on what busi-
ness models, end-user innovations, and forms of social cooperation
develop in the environment generated by technological innovation
and regulation. If we are really serious about guaranteeing media ac-
cess, we must focus on the design of the media ecology, because some
kinds of ecologies make media access much easier or much harder to
accomplish. If media access is easier today than it was in 1967, it is
because technological developments, shaped by law and by public in-
vestment, have helped create technological infrastructures, business
models, and social practices that make access far easier.
In saying this, I am not making a claim of technological determin-
ism. Rather, my point is precisely the opposite. People may be
tempted to think that the Internet by itself has solved the problem of
media access once and for all. But the Internet by itself does not guar-
antee effective media access. It has to be built, based on whatever
incentives law provides, and it has to be built in a certain way: to facil-
itate openness and participation. It is possible to have a relatively
closed Internet that inhibits widespread access, that uses closed or
proprietary architectures and standards, that restricts the creation and
deployment of new third-party applications, and that tends to relegate
end users to largely passive roles as consumers. It is also possible to
have a relatively open Internet that generates third-party innovation
and business models that in turn encourage widespread access, inno-
vation, and participation by end users. The key question is how we
should organize telecommunications policy to promote the latter
goals. Media access depends on creating incentives for different kinds
of conduits and media models to thrive. In particular, it depends on
policies that promote innovation and prevent incumbents from block-
ing new ideas and new competition. Media access depends on a com-
bination of good technological design encouraged by sound
innovation policy, information policy, and free speech values.
What role do the judicially enforceable guarantees of the First
Amendment play in these debates? In his essay for this Symposium,
Frederick Schauer points out that one can describe that role in one of
two ways. 32 First, one might say that the First Amendment articulates
values that are underenforced by the courts, because, for example,
32 Frederick Schauer, Hohfeld's First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 914, 928-30
(2008).
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courts are not institutionally well-suited to protect them.33 Second,
and more broadly, one might argue that First Amendment law is actu-
ally a special case of a more general set of policy goals.
34
I think that both these claims are true. As to the first point, I
believe that there are First Amendment values that go beyond First
Amendment doctrine. Sometimes these values are best enforced not
by constitutional courts, but by legislatures, administrative agencies,
and by courts interpreting statutes and regulations. Indeed, they are
sometimes best enforced by the design and implementation of tech-
nology. But the second point is, to my mind, even more important
than the first. The judicial doctrines that express First Amendment
values form only a subset of a larger concern that I would call knowl-
edge and information policy. The judicial doctrines of the First
Amendment, and even what we might call "First Amendment values,"
are only special cases of this larger concern.
Briefly stated, the goals of knowledge and information policy are:
(1) to promote the production and diffusion of valuable information
and knowledge; (2) to develop a healthy and vibrant public sphere of
opinion and culture; (3) to encourage widespread participation in a
culture of information and knowledge production that arises from a
broad, diverse, and antagonistic set of sources; (4) to promote innova-
tion in, widespread availability of, and access to knowledge and infor-
mation technologies; and (5) to develop human capacities and human
capabilities through the spread of knowledge and information tech-
nologies. As you can see from this list, First Amendment values play
an important role in knowledge and information policy, but the latter
encompasses far more. Policies that promote scientific research, edu-
cation, and universal access to telecommunications facilities, for ex-
ample, overlap with free speech values, but their scope is far broader.
Knowledge and information policy includes, for example, concerns
about innovation and competition, technological development, and
the creation of new applications and delivery methods for knowledge
production. Other areas of law, like intellectual property law, focus
on these goals and on knowledge production generally, but we cannot
reduce their concerns to those of the First Amendment.
Indeed, we would be better served by seeing free speech values as
a subset of a larger set of concerns with family resemblances to the
values of freedom of speech. For example, what Ed Felten calls the
33 See id. at 928-29.
34 See id. at 929-30.
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"freedom to tinker" 35-the right to experiment with new applications,
discover how products are made, and add new innovations-has obvi-
ous analogies with and similarities to freedom of speech, but it is not
the same thing. Promoting open systems and open standards in tech-
nology, and promoting interoperability between different technologies
and software, may be quite important to promoting democratic partic-
ipation in technologies and technical innovation, and it may ultimately
assist the growth and spread of knowledge and free expression.36 The
Internet, for example, was made possible by the adoption of certain
open standards that allowed interoperation between different commu-
nications networks and promoted the creation of new applications
that could be delivered over these networks. Once again, the values
of open standards and interoperability bear a family resemblance to
the values of freedom of speech, but they are not identical to them.
Knowledge and information policy, which includes free speech
values, should guide and inform how we design media institutions.
When I speak of "design," I do not simply mean passing laws or creat-
ing social institutions. I also mean the design of technology itself.
One lesson of the Verizon story that begins this Essay is that techno-
logical design can be more or less free speech friendly, and more or
less participatory. At the same time, the legal rules that regulate tech-
nology can promote business practices that encourage media access
and democratic participation in mass media or, conversely, practices
that seek to limit access and make end users more like passive
consumers.
Thus, if we want to promote media access today, we need to look
beyond the boundaries of judicially created First Amendment rights.
Telecommunications regulation-and, in particular, the debate over
open access and network neutrality-has important consequences for
media access. To be sure, network neutrality policies prevent certain
forms of content censorship by conduits, and open access policies pro-
mote competition among ISPs that will lead at least some ISPs to
promise not to censor. Yet, a more important argument for these poli-
cies is that they might promote innovation in content delivery, appli-
cations, and content production that comes from entrepreneurs
outside the current duopoly of cable and phone companies. People
should be able to create new applications to be laid on top of the
35 Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.coin (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
36 See Laura DeNardis & Eric Tam, Open Documents and Democracy: A Political Basis
for Open Document Standards 4-5, 25 (Nov. 1, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Yale
Information Society Project), available at http://www.ifap.ru/library/book255.pdf.
[Vol. 76:933
HeinOnline -- 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 942 2007-2008
Media Access: A Question of Design
broadband network without fear that they will be blocked by broad-
band providers. And individuals and start-ups should be able to serve
not only text, but also video and multimedia, without fear that they
will be blocked or slowed down because their content and applications
compete with broadband companies or their business partners.
A second set of issues, and somewhat closer to traditional free
speech concerns, involves the liability of conduits for content that
travels through their networks or is posted on the servers of online
service providers. In 1967, Barron pointed out that New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan37 was not necessarily a great victory for freedom of
speech. It merely aided powerful media organizations without secur-
ing greater access. 38 But if today's conduits make money by allowing
end users and other strangers to upload content and maintain new
applications through their facilities, then greater conduit liability may
cause them to block or close off access; conversely, limiting conduit
liability can promote media access.
Section 230(c)(1) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act 39 immu-
nizes broadband companies, ISPs, and online service providers for ob-
jectionable material that flows through their channels. 40 It may be one
of the most important laws in the United States for making possible
business models that promote media access by ordinary individuals;
indeed, in terms of its practical effects, it may be even more important
than many aspects of First Amendment doctrine. Because § 230 does
not apply to intellectual property questions, the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA")41 has also proved crucial. The Act's safe
harbor provisions limit liability for copyright violations for material
posted on online service providers or flowing through conduits. 42
Without these safe harbor provisions, many features of current In-
ternet practice-including the development of Web 2.0 applications
that leverage the content contributions of many people-would be le-
gally risky. Indeed, were it not for statutory safe harbors and other
limits on copyright liability, the basic practices of search engines, and
indeed much of the traffic on the Internet, might be illegal.
37 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
38 See Barron, supra note 1, at 1657-60.
39 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
40 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000).
41 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
42 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2000).
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Neither § 230 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act nor the
DMCA are perfect solutions. Section 230(c)(1) may provide immu-
nity for constitutionally unprotected activities that are not really nec-
essary to ensure media access, while the DMCA's provisions, which
offer far less protection than § 230, may not go far enough. They may
sometimes favor the interests of large content industries over smaller
and anonymous end users. Perhaps more to the point, § 230(c)(2) im-
munizes conduits when they censor the speech of others,43 which may
actually encourage business models that limit media access in some
circumstances. Nevertheless, statutory immunities, and not the First
Amendment, have proved vitally important in creating the rich ecol-
ogy of creativity and free expression that we see on the Internet today.
IV. Media Design and Mass Participation
Barron correctly understood that private power affected people's
practical ability to express themselves; private power also affected the
health, vibrancy, and diversity of the public sphere.44 He also under-
stood that the law of freedom of speech must pay attention to techno-
logical change, especially changes in technologies of communication4-
Much of what he said in 1967 still rings true today, despite the enor-
mous opportunities for individual communication that the digital age
has made possible.
But what Barron did not see in 1967 is as important as what he
did see. When Barron wrote his article in 1967, one of the towering
figures in First Amendment theory was Alexander Meiklejohn, who
tied the purposes of the First Amendment to the production of infor-
mation necessary for deliberation about issues of public concern.46
Barron's arguments were both influenced by and limited by
Meiklejohn's conception. First, like Meiklejohn, Barron took existing
business models of the broadcast media for granted; thus, he assumed
that relatively few people would be able to use the mass communica-
tions media of his day.47 That is why Barron wanted representatives
of the community to have a limited right of access; he assumed that
not everyone could enjoy such a right.
43 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
44 See Barron, supra note 1, at 1643-44, 1646-47.
45 See id. at 1643-47, 1650-51.
46 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE 163-64 (1965).
47 See Barron, supra note 1, at 1647.
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Accepting the basic structure of mass communications created a
second problem: Meiklejohn's model of freedom of speech and demo-
cratic deliberation was not strongly participatory. It was based on the
metaphor of a New England town meeting, with limited time and a
controlled agenda.48 What mattered was getting relevant information
out to the electorate, not ensuring that each of them would get the
time or the opportunity to express themselves. This idea made perfect
sense given the existing structure of the mass media. But it created a
tension with Barron's own instincts about the purpose of the First
Amendment, which were much more participatory than Meiklejohn's.
Barron was (and is) a law professor, and so he viewed the solu-
tion to the problem of media access through a law professor's eyes.
He proposed creating an individual cause of action for media access,
either under the First Amendment or through legislation. 49 In ad-
dressing the problem this way, he did three things. First, he assumed
that the best solution to a violation of individual access was granting
particular individuals judicial causes of action against newspapers and
broadcasters. Second, he assumed that the best way to secure practi-
cal free speech rights was through judicial interpretations of the First
Amendment or a statute that judges would apply. Third, he took the
existing technological structure and existing business models of mass
media for granted and asked lawmakers or judges to add a minor
gloss.
Once he took those business models as a given, however, Barron
was very limited in the sort of remedies he could propose. There were
simply too many people who wanted to speak and too little space
available. His actual proposals were quite modest. He argued that
individuals who could prove that they were representative of "a signif-
icant sector of the community" would have the right to petition for a
right of access.50 Courts would use a contextual judgment to deter-
mine whether access should be granted, based on a number of factors,
including the petitioner's representativeness, whether the petitioner's
speech was being excluded or censored by the media, and the degree
of competition in the media.51 He also argued that in return for the
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan privilege, newspapers should offer
rights of reply to persons who had been attacked in their pages.
52
48 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 46, at 24-28.
49 See Barron, supra note 1, at 1667, 1669-70.
50 Id. at 1677-78.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 1657-60.
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Barron was deeply concerned with abuses of private power. He
recognized that the privately owned mass media of his day were con-
duits for speech that closely tied editorial functions with dissemination
functions.5 3 But he did not focus on the basic technological and regu-
latory issues that created the disparity in access and the resulting im-
poverishment of the public sphere. He treated the technology of his
times-and, more importantly, the governing models for making
money with that technology-as more or less given.54 He accepted
the Meiklejohnian motto that "what is essential is not that everyone
shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said," 55 and that
given the limited opportunities for speech, the speech that was most
important to promote was political speech.5 6
Meiklejohn's theory of free speech was premised on a mass me-
dia and broadcast model that assumed the legitimacy of existing tech-
nological structures and business practices. And once one assumed
this, a great deal followed. In this model, the most important speech
comes from media that are one-to-many: newspapers, radio, movies,
and television. These media are controlled by a very small number of
people. As a result, we must focus on the rights of listeners, not
speakers, and we must make sure that listeners-that is, the public-
get all the information they need to ensure a healthy democracy.5 7
And because time and space are limited, we must make sure they get
access to the most important kind of speech in a democracy: speech
that concerns matters of public importance directed to the great issues
of the day.5 8 In short, Meiklejohn's vision of what the First Amend-
ment meant and how best to protect First Amendment rights was
structured by background features of technology and information pol-
icy that were not inevitable. These background features profoundly
shaped the constitutional theories of his era, even as they do today.
What would the alternatives have been in 1967? Barron did not
argue-and we can hardly blame him for not arguing-that the proper
response to the problem of private censorship was to invent the In-
ternet. Create a network of networks, lower the costs of distribution,
and make it possible for everyone to be a broadcaster and a publisher,
and the problem of private censorship is ameliorated. People can
53 See, e.g., id. at 1642-43.
54 See id. at 1644-47.
55 Id. at 1653 (quoting MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 46, at 26).
56 Id. at 1668.
57 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 46, at 26.
58 See id.
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route around traditional media gatekeepers; they can glom onto, com-
ment on, and criticize what the mass media do.59 It is true that they
will not have access to NBC, but if they become a blogger and say
things that other people want to read-like Markos Moulitsas, the
founder of Daily Kos-then someday maybe NBC, and political can-
didates too, will come running to their doorstep.
In 1967, Jerome Barron could not have been expected to imagine
the Internet, the hypertext protocol (the basis for the World Wide
Web), blogging, YouTube, and Web 2.0 applications. Indeed, as late
as 2000, people did not recognize the importance of blogging in chang-
ing political discourse. We can hardly expect Barron to have seen it
coming. Nor could we have expected him to write all this up in the
Harvard Law Review. In fact, if he had written an article about how
to redesign telecommunications facilities, the Harvard Law Review
would probably have rejected his article. Not legal scholarship, they
would say: it belongs in a journal of public policy, or maybe even elec-
trical engineering. Our ideas about how to think about law and tech-
nology are different today. The growth of the Internet is a big reason
why.
All the Internet does, however, is make salient features of our
world that were already present in 1967. If the Internet sensitizes us
to the issues of technological design and information policy, those is-
sues were also present in 1967. They existed, and continue to exist,
even before we ask whether judges should grant limited rights of reply
to representatives of significant elements of the community.
Suppose we had thought about media access not in terms of judi-
cially enforceable interpretations of the First Amendment, but in
terms of the design of the media ecology. What could we, from the
perspective of 1967, have imagined?
First, we might have focused on the fact that broadcasting was a
conduit. It was a way of getting speech from one place to another.
The person who owned the conduit did not have to be the person who
controlled the content. We could, in theory, divide up these functions.
And not merely in theory: telephone companies were already treated
differently from broadcasters. They owned the conduits, but they
were common carriers and could not control content going over their
lines. If government wanted to expand the number of speakers, it
could require some broadcast licensees-as a condition of their li-
59 See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Digital Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9-13 (2004).
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cense-to operate as common carriers of radio and television signals.
This would change their business models, causing them to focus pri-
marily on the quality and reach of their signals. Or the FCC could
require that some licensees act as common carriers with respect to
parts of their broadcast day. For example, from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.,
Channel 4 would have to sell its airtime on a "first come, first served"
basis, in thirty-minute blocks, to anyone who wanted to broadcast.
After 2:00 p.m., Channel 4's owners would control content. In addi-
tion, government could reserve some channels for government-owned
and -operated stations of two types. One type would deliver educa-
tional and public affairs programming. Another type would be a dedi-
cated electronic public forum, open to anyone who wanted to use it.
Second, we might have argued that the radio and television spec-
trums imposed artificial scarcity. The radio and television bands were
not necessarily fixed; they were shaped by existing business models as
well as by the design of existing radio receivers. Even within the ex-
isting AM and FM bands, there was much more room available than
government actually licensed. Moreover, the government prevented
the development of broadcast licenses for low-power radio transmis-
sions that could reach whole neighborhoods, purportedly due to fear
of interference, but more likely, one suspects, due to pressure from
major media outlets who feared new competition.60 If government
shaped its licensing policies to maximize participation and relaxed its
bans on low-power transmissions, many more people could have ef-
fective access to a wider public.
Third, spread-spectrum technologies already existed in 1967.
They were developed during World War II and used for military pur-
poses. These allowed many different radio broadcasts to share fre-
quencies without interference. The government could have offered
tax incentives or subsidized research into developing these spread-
spectrum technologies for commercial applications, created incentives
for the production of commercial radios that could receive these
transmissions, and reserved bands for spectrum-sharing technologies,
thereby allowing a much wider array of individuals to be broadcasters.
With sufficient effort, the technology might have been adapted to tele-
vision broadcasts as well. 61
60 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment
Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1, 13-17 (2002).
61 See Yochai Benkler & Lawrence Lessig, Net Gains: Will Technology Make CBS Uncon-
stitutional?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 14, 1998, at 15. The FCC came comparatively late to the
development of spread-spectrum technology, issuing a notice of inquiry in June 1981. See Au-
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Fourth, radio, television, and newspapers in the 1960s were one-
to-many media. One entity broadcast to many people. That is what
made these media so powerful as methods of communication and also
limited who had access to them. But we did not have to devote radio
and television spectrum primarily for one-to-many communications.
One of the government's early decisions in regulating the airwaves in
the 1920s was to prefer commercial mass broadcasters to amateur ra-
dio operators, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of a world dominated
by one-to-many broadcasting.62 That result, however, was hardly nec-
essary, either as a matter of technology or as a matter of good policy.
The government might have poured money into, and designed regula-
tory and tax incentives toward, encouraging the use of one-to-one or
one-to-few communications, especially for education and discussion of
issues of public concern. Ham radio and citizen's band radio, both of
which were still quite active in 1967, were both one-to-many and one-
to-one; both, however, were placed on separate bands from commer-
cial radio. If government were serious about encouraging mass partic-
ipation in broadcasting, it might have chosen very different policies.
With sufficient thought, we could probably multiply these exam-
ples. What they all have in common is that they seek to expand the
number of people who have effective access to media, not by ac-
cepting existing business models and laying a judicial remedy of access
on top of them, but by redesigning the system of mass communica-
tions. We might do this by separating content provision from content
delivery, by relaxing technological restrictions that reduce the number
of broadcast licenses, by giving incentives to develop new commercial
technologies, and by creating new institutional frameworks for media
production. That is to say, we might secure media access through
build-out requirements, through structural regulation, through tech-
nological regulation, and through innovation policy. None of these
proposals would have violated anybody's First Amendment rights.
Far from punishing people from speaking, they would have used the
powers of the administrative and welfare state to increase opportuni-
ties for more people to speak and to have effective access to broadcast
media.
thorization of Spread Spectrum and Other Wideband Emissions Not Presently Provided for in
the FCC Rules and Regulations, Notice of Inquiry, 87 F.C.C.2d 876 (1981).
62 See Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally
Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 309, 314 (1998) ("The present regulatory
system was fashioned around the needs of one model of wireless communications: broadcast-
ing.... [T]o make possible a consumer market in simple receivers, which were at the time the
sole product appropriate for mass marketing.").
2008]
HeinOnline -- 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 949 2007-2008
The George Washington Law Review
And there is the rub. All of these proposals for greater media
access in the 1960s, other than Barron's original proposal, had two
things in common. First, most of the proposals required that govern-
ments spend money, either in the form of direct subsidies, tax breaks,
or government-run stations. Second, each of these proposals would
have been opposed by the incumbent broadcast and newspaper indus-
tries. After all, who wants extra competition? By contrast, Barron's
argument for a First Amendment right of media access was a remark-
ably modest proposal that did not seriously threaten existing business
models, no matter how much newspapers and broadcasters claimed it
violated their First Amendment rights. The proposals for technologi-
cal innovation that I have described above would not violate anyone's
constitutional freedoms. But incumbent media would have been just
as opposed to them as to Barron's proposal. Much has changed today,
but one thing has not: the biggest opponents of structural regulation
designed to promote media access tend to be incumbent organizations
whose existing models of doing business are threatened by new com-
petition and new media participation. If we want to increase practical
access to communications media, we must not take incumbent busi-
ness models for granted and graft judicial remedies atop them. Rapid
technological change teaches us that no way of doing business is sa-
cred and, therefore, no government system of communications regula-
tion that facilitates that way of doing business should be sacred either.
It is always possible to imagine things differently.
Conclusion
Much of the debate over media access has struggled with a series
of interesting jurisprudential questions: whether the First Amendment
protects positive liberties or only negative ones; whether it includes a
right of access or merely a right against noninterference; and whether
free speech rights give people rights over communicative property, so
that the right to speak requires access to media or, to the contrary, is
violated when the state requires access to a private party's newspaper
or television station. But technology policy is prior to all these issues.
It is not prior logically or jurisprudentially, but practically. If the sys-
tem of mass communications is designed correctly, better media ac-
cess is built into the system and into the existing models of business
competition. Greater media access occurs without having to fight
over whether the First Amendment guarantees positive rights and, if it
does, whether the judiciary is the proper institution to recognize and
enforce them. One reason why people fight over positive rights in
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media law is because previous decisions in shaping competition and
technology have driven us there. But if we are willing to change our
attitudes about technology policy, the issues of freedom of expression,
and the role of courts, can start to look quite different.
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